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This paper estimates particulate production functions to study how particulates co-move with
manufacturing activity after controlling for climate, and regulatory factors. In addition to studying
whether more regulated counties enjoy less pollution per unit of economic activity, I also study
whether particulate regulation displaces economic growth to less regulated areas.
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I. Introduction
Particulate concentration levels have fallen across the United States since 1970.l Forty six
states enjoyed particulate reductions between 1981 and 1987 with a sharp reduction in particulates
occurring between 1981 and 1982. This paper uses a large panel data set of ambient particulate
readings, economic activity, and regulatory proxies to explore the relationship between county air
quality and county economic activity.2 I test whether the decline in particulates is better explained
by declines in manufacturing activity versus declines in pollution per unit of manufacturing. If the
decline of manufacturing explains lowered particulates, then this would indicate a "silver lining" of
de-industrialization. Since a service economy's output does not create the negative health externalities
associated with manufacturing, GNP would be a better indicator of the representative agent's
welfare.3
The second goal of this study is to quantify particulate regulation's role in lowering county
particulate levels. To study the Clean Air Act's impact, I partition all counties into those that were
assigned to the non-attainment and the attainment categories in 1977.1 study whether more regulated
counties have enjoyed greater particulate improvements. It is important to understand why
particulates has improved to assess the benefits of environmental regulation. Previous research has
JThe EPA estimates that particulate emissions have fallen 62% between 1970 and 1987 (Portney
1990). Crandall (1983) presents evidence on 1970s particulate trends.
industrial processes account for 35 % of particulate emissions and stationary fuel combustion
accounts for 26% while highway vehicles account for 18%
3Both hedonic studies (Blomquist et. al. 1988, Smith and Hwang 1995) and epidemiological
studies (Ostro 1987, Portney and Mullahy 1990, Ranson and Pope 1995) indicate that people value
lower particulate levels.
The benefits of the permanent reduction in particulates during the 1980s can be estimated by
combining hedonic estimates of the value of life with epidemiology estimates of the mortality costs
from particulates. Borrowing from Portney's (1981) study, if one more unit of particulates leads to
.5 deaths per 100,000 people per year, then a reduction of eight units saves 10,000 people a year.
If the value of life is one million dollars per person, then the yearly value of the reduction is 10
billion dollar.
reported mixed evidence on the benefits of EPA regulation. MacAvoy (1987) finds no evidence that
heavily regulated industries pollute less. Henderson (1995) reports that ground level ozone fell by
3 to 8% when a county was switched into non-attainment, more heavily regulated, status. Magat
and Viscusi (1991) have examined pulp and paper mills' compliance with water pollution regulation
and found that inspections increase future compliance.
In addition to studying the relationship between county manufacturing and particulates in
more and less regulated areas, I also study whether particulate regulation has displaced economic
growth to less regulated counties. These tests are based on aggregate county manufacturing data and
on the microdata set extracted from the Census of Manufacturer's Longitudinal Research Database
(LRD). This research adds to Henderson's (1995) recent work on the displacement effects of ozone
regulation.
This paper is organized as follows. Section Two presents my data sources. Section Three
reports trends in particulates and manufacturing during the 1980s. Section Four presents levels and
differenced multivariate particulate regressions. Section Five studies whether Clean Air Act
regulation is encouraging the displacement of economic activity to clean counties. Section Six
concludes.
II. Data
The particulate data source is the EPA's Aeromatic Information Retrieval System (AIRS) data
base. Particulates were sampled in 35% of all counties. The EPA chooses monitoring locations to
identify which areas are not in attainment of the Clean Air Act standards so that it can impose more
stringent regulation to bring these areas into compliance. EPA monitoring intensity varies across
states. In California in 1981, there was one particulate monitoring station for every 161,000 people
while in Ohio there was one particulate monitoring station for every 32,000 people.
Monitoring generates a large data base that can be used to study pollution trends. The data
contains approximately 25,000 observations and covers all AIRS monitoring stations between 1981
and 1989. As the EPA switched to a PM-10 standard in 1987, many of the particulate monitoring
stations were closed down. In 1981, there were 3,742 monitors. Monitoring decreased to 3,083 by
1984 and fell further to 2,163 by 1988. In 1989, there are 1,344 monitor readings reported. Some
counties have many monitoring stations. In 1981, 1,108 counties were monitored while by 1987
there were 904 counties monitored and this fell to 561 by 1989. As would be expected, monitoring
stations which had higher 1981 participate readings were less likely to be closed by 1989. I have
estimated a logit model of closure probability and found that a monitoring station with a initial
reading of 65 milligrams per cubic meter, located in a non-attainment county, had a 42% probability
of being closed in 1989. A monitoring station with an initial reading of 55 milligrams per cubic
meter, located in an attainment county, had a 59% chance of being closed in 1989.
Two manufacturing data sets are used in this study. The source for both is the Department
of Commerce. The first data set is the national REIS data set. For each county from 1969-1992, this
data reports county manufacturing employment. I use county yearly manufacturing employment as
a proxy for county economic activity.4 The correlation between county manufacturing employment
and county non-manufacturing employment is greater than .9.
The second manufacturing data set is a special extract of Rust Belt plants from the
Longitudinal Research Database.5 This data set of 215,650 plants includes information on the
plant's total employment in 1967, 1972, 1977, 1982 and 1987, the plant's SIC code and its state and
county location. This micro data is used to study manufacturing plants' survival rate as a function
of their two digit SIC code, plant size, and whether the plant is located in a more heavily regulated
county. Conditional on surviving, I study plant employment growth in more and less regulated
counties.
To proxy for particulate regulation's intensity, I used the 1979 Federal Registar 40 CFR part
81 to assign all counties into two groups; those in attainment and those not in attainment with the
Clean Air Act's particulate standard in 1977. Counties not in compliance face stricter regulation to
bring them into compliance. Based on this data, 384 counties were assigned to non-attainment status.
industrial processes account for 35 % of particulate emissions and stationary fuel combustion
accounts for 26% while highway vehicles account for 18%.
5The Census Bureau has developed a Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) which is a time
series of economic variables collected from manufacturing establishments in the Census of
Manufacturers and Annual Survey of Manufacturers programs. The LRD file contains establishment
level identifying information; basic information on the factors of production and the products
produced (LRD Technical Documentation Manual 1992). The data file includes geographical
information identifying each plant's state, county, smsa, and place.
All regressions will be estimated separately for the two groups.6 In 1987, the EPA started to
regulate only a subset of smaller particulates, PM-10. From the Clean Air Deskbook. I have listed
the roughly 70 counties assigned to the PM-10 non-attainment group. In my particulate data set,
68% of counties were in attainment with the 1977 particulate standard and the 1987 PM-10 standard
while 3% were in non-attainment of both standards. Impressively, 90% of all counties that were
assigned to the particulate non-attainment category in 1977 were in attainment with the PM-10
standard in 1987. Finally, 4% of counties in attainment in 1977 were not in attainment with the PM-
10 standard in 1987.7
The climate data source is the NOAA CD-ROM. This data base contains yearly readings on
temperature and rainfall at various monitoring stations across each state. I use yearly rainfall as a
proxy for county climate. Increased rain should decrease an area's ambient particulate level.
Summary statistics by attainment status are presented in Table One. Non-attainment counties
have much higher particulate levels and much higher manufacturing levels. It is also important to
note non-attainment counties are heavily over sampled. Roughly 10% of all counties are not in
attainment but roughly half of the monitoring stations are in non-attainment areas.
III. Particulate and Manufacturing Trends
Table Two presents quantiles of the particulate distribution for certain years between 1981
and 1989 for all counties and also reports quantiles for those counties that were and were not
assigned to non-attainment status.8 The key point to note is the sharp improvement in particulate
levels between 1981 and 1982. If regulation were the sole reason for improvement and regulation
6In previous research, I have studied whether Federal and State real per-capita transfers to the
state EPA could be used as a proxy for regulatory intensity. Unfortunately, this data represents the
transfer for all six pollutants regulated under the Clean Air Act. Thus, California receives the largest
per-capita transfers. Even though it has a relatively low particulate level, its ozone problems merit
large transfers.
7It is relevant to note that roughly two thirds of the PM-10 non-attainment counties are located
in western states such as Colorado, Montana, Utah, Wyoming, Arizona, Nevada, Idaho, Oregon,
Washington, and California.
8Particulate trends in the 1970s are reported in Crandall (1983, pi8).
was concentrated on high polluting counties, then we should observe the 25th percentile and the
median not changing over time and that the 75th percentile of the distribution is shifting in. Table
Two indicates that all percentiles of the particulate distribution decreased between 1981 and 1982.
The 25th percentile of the 1981 particulate distribution is greater than the median of the 1989
particulate distribution. The 25th and 75th percentiles of the distribution fell 16% and 14.5%,
respectively, between 1981 and 1982.
Suggestive evidence of regulatory success would be if particulates have improved by more
in non-attainment than attainment counties. Table Two shows that median particulates have improved
in both attainment and non-attainment counties. Between 1981 and 1982, median particulates fell
from 55.8 to 46.2 in attainment counties and fell from 62.2 to 53.9 in non-attainment counties. Note
that for both sets of counties air quality slightly degraded between 1982 and 1989.
Table Three exploits the panel nature of the data to present a transition matrix of changes in
a monitoring station's particulate readings from 1981 to 1987. I have readings in 1981 and 1987 for
1,888 different stations. In 1981,1 assign each station to one of ten deciles where #1 is the best air
quality and #10 is the worst. Sorting by particulate level in 1987,1 reassign each monitoring station
to a 1987 decile. Table Three presents the transition matrix where a given (i,j) element of the matrix
indicates the percentage of monitoring stations in decile i in 1981 that are in decile j in 1987. The
correlation of the ranks between 1981 and 1987 is .75. If the main diagonal of Table Three had all
been l's then this would indicate that all stations preserve rank between 1981 and 1987. In fact,
the main diagonal in Table Three does have large values but there is certainly evidence of upward
and downward mobility for stations in the middle of the distribution in 1981. Interestingly, the
cleanest and dirtiest counties in 1981 are "stuck". For the cleanest 10% of all monitoring stations
in 1981, 83% of these stations are in the top two deciles in 1987. For the dirtiest 10% of all
monitoring stations in 1981, 82% of these stations are in the bottom two deciles in 1987. Table Two
indicates that the distribution at all quantiles shifted in from 1981 to 1982. Table Three indicates that
monitoring stations roughly preserved rank between 1981 and 1987.
Table Four presents median state particulate levels in 1981 and presents the growth rate from
1981 to 1982 and from 1982 to 1987. It is interesting to note that particulates fell in 45 of the 48
states between 1981 and 1982 but particulates only fell in 14 states between 1982 and 1987. The state
trends do not exhibit a common pattern. For example, Rust Belt states such as Illinois and Indiana
experienced sharp reductions in particulates from 1981 to 1982 but then particulate levels remained
roughly constant between 1982 and 1987. For other Rust Belt states such as Ohio, Pennsylvania, and
West Virginia, particulates continued to decline between 1982 and 1987. The west generally
exhibited degradation. Arizona, Idaho, Nevada, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington all suffered
increased particulates between 1982 and 1987.
Table Five presents state growth rates in manufacturing employment between 1981 and 1982
and from 1982 to 1987. With the exception of Nevada, every state suffered manufacturing job loss
between 1981 and 1982. For example, manufacturing employment declined by 11 % in Ohio and 12%
in West Virginia. Between 1982 and 1987 only twelve states suffered continued manufacturing
decline. Rust Belt employment grew more slowly than states such as Arizona and Nevada that grew
at 23% and 24% respectively.9
IV. The Relationship Between Particulates and Manufacturing
To study the relationship between particulates and manufacturing, I estimate pollution
production functions. My methodology is to regress the log of a county's yearly mean particulate
reading (TSP) on year dummies, county manufacturing interacted with the year dummies and climate
variables.
log(TSPJt) = c+Y, yt*Yeart + B2t Manufjt + £ <bt*Manufjt*Yeart + B4 rainjt + ejt
Table Six presents four separate regressions estimates based on equation (1). I estimate
separate regressions for attainment and non-attainment counties using least squares and a panel
9Dufry (1994) finds that the Manufacturing Belt's share of manufacturing employment fell from
61% to 47% between 1963 and 1987.
estimator that controls for county specific fixed effects.10 Conditional on the fixed effects, climate,
and manufacturing proxies, I assume that the disturbance term is iid.
Estimates of equation (1) control for county levels of economic activity, while estimating how
the pollution content per unit of manufacturing has changed over time. Table Six presents the results.
The manufacturing coefficient estimates indicate that an extra unit of manufacturing causes more
pollution in attainment counties than in non-attainment counties. The manufacturing coefficient is
statistically significant at the 5 % level in three of the four regressions and is statistically significant
at the 10% level for all four regressions. The least squares estimates indicate that an increase of
100,000 more manufacturing jobs in 1981 increases an attainment county's particulate levels by
12.3% and a non-attainment county's particul?te xevel by 4%. Using the panel estimator, the
estimates are 20.4% and 8%, respectively. Both sets of estimates indicate that pollution per unit of
manufacturing is higher in attainment counties.
The coefficient estimates of manufacturing's impact are useful for simulating the "silver
lining" of industrial decline. Between 1981 and 1982, Cook County in Illinois (Chicago) lost 50,000
manufacturing jobs. Given that Cook County was a non-attainment area, the regression estimates
indicates that this should translate into a 10^ reduction in particulates. Interestingly, Chicago's
particulates did fall by 10% between 1981 and 1982. However, between 1982 and 1987 Chicago's
manufacturing level fell by 16% but particulates showed little improvement.
The year dummies indicate that particulates fell sharply in both the non-attainment and
attainment counties between 1981 and 1982 but the year dummies for both regressions are roughly
constant from 1982 to 1989.
Table Six presents no evidence that the pollution per uruv of manufacturing is falling over
time for either attainment or non-attainment counties. In fact, pollution per unit of manufacturing
increases and is statistically significant in 1987-1989. This result is surprising because over time
older higher polluting plants might die and be replaced by capital of newer vintages that fall under
10County fixed effects are included to control for variation in geography. These fixed effects also
control for unobserved county and state specific factors such as regulatory enforcement intensity.
more stringent Clean Air Act new source legislation.11
The bottom of Table Six reports F-tests that the county fixed effects are highly statistically
significant. Although the county fixed effects are statistically significant, it is interesting to note that
the least squares results presented in Table Six yield roughly similar coefficient estimates. I have also
estimated this model with state fixed effects rather than county and again found comparable results.
An alternative to estimating equation (1) separately for the attainment and non-attainment
counties would be to pool them and include an attainment dummy that equals one if the county was
not in attainment in 1979. If this dummy is an exogenous variable then its coefficient would indicate
the "treatment effect" of being assigned to the non-attainment category.12
A model that attempts to estimate county specific fixed effects and estimate the non-attainment
status dummy is not identified. In attempting to estimate the non-attainment status dummy, I
included state fixed effects, climate and manufacturing.13 In results that are available on request,
I found that controlling for climate and manufacturing, non-attainment counties have 9% higher
particulate levels than attainment counties. I interpret this as evidence that even with state fixed
effects, the attainment dummy is correlated with the disturbance term. To control for attainment
status endogeneity, I have tried instrumenting for attainment status using a county's manufacturing
employment in 1969 and the growth rate of county manufacturing employment from 1969 to 1975,
and whether sulfur dioxide was monitored in the county in 1975. Unfortunately, I have found that
my two stage least squares estimates are highly sensitive to the set of instruments used and that this
set of instruments yields a low R2 (roughly .10) in the first stage.14 Given the weak explanatory
11
 Worried that this finding may be explained by the fact that cleaner areas were less likely to
monitor particulates in 1989, I estimated this model using only counties that had at least one
monitoring station in operation in all years between 1981 and 1989. This balanced panel estimation
yielded quite similar results that particulates per unit of manufacturing increased in the late 1980s.
12In his ozone study, Henderson (1995) is able to estimate the "treatment effect" of being
assigned to non-attainment status because for ozone individual counties have switched from
attainment status to non-attainment status and vice-versa.
13This model is identified because within almost all states there is variation in county attainment
status.
14The problem is that attainment status in 1979 depends on manufacturing levels in 1978 and
1979. Unfortunately, these lagged manufacturing county levels are very highly correlated (at .9 or
higher) with current county manufacturing levels and current manufacturing levels are a crucial
8
power of my instruments, I am pessimistic about identifying the counter-factual of how a random
county's particulate level would evolve had it been assigned to non-attainment status. The results
presented in Table Six should be interpreted as revealing how county particulates have evolved over
time conditional on attainment status.15
This first set of estimates of the impact of manufacturing on particulates imposed that
manufacturing's pollution content does not differ across space. Yet, "Rust Belt" states such as Ohio
and Michigan are the home of many of the older manufacturing plants that might have higher
pollution levels.16 To explore this composition effect, I estimated equation (1) for just the "Rust
Belt" states.17 It is relevant to note that 34% of the monitoring stations in my sample are located
in these states. Table Seven reports the county panel estimates for the "Rust Belt" sample. Note
that the marginal impact of manufacturing on particulates is greater than twice as large for the Rust
Belt sample than for the national sample as reported in Table Six. Interestingly, the regression's R2
rise sharply to .34 for this subset of the data.
To further study particulate trends, I estimate a growth rate specification that includes the log
of the county's mean particulates in 1981. The regression is presented in equation (2).
A log(TSPit)=c + B2 A \og(Manufit) + B3 A log(rainit) + B4 log(7SP.81) + A Vit (2)
Analogous to the convergence growth literature, I study particulate growth rates with respect
variable for explaining current particulate levels.
15Analogous to the job training literature, I have estimated the benefits of the program for the
set of subjects who chose to take training (those assigned to the more regulated non-attainment
group). I have not estimated what the benefits of "training" would have been for a random subject
who chose not to take training (a county in the attainment group).
16Lugar and Evans (1988) find that plants in the same industry located in different places have
different production functions. Garcia-Mila and McGuire (1993) report evidence that state economies
are not microcosms of the national economy.
17These include; Illinois, Indiana, New Jersey, Michigan, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and
West Virginia.
to initial levels while controlling for changes in economic activity.18 This regression answers
whether initially more polluted counties are "catching up" over time to the cleaner counties. If the
EPA focuses its regulatory efforts on the highest polluting counties than we would expect to observe
convergence. This regression complements the particulate transition matrix presented in Table Three.
Table Eight reports an estimate of equation (2) where I have pooled attainment and non-
attainment counties. The dependent variable is the percentage growth of particulates for a given
monitoring station between 1981 and 1987. The independent regressors include the growth rate in
county manufacturing employment, growth in rainfall and the monitoring station's particulate reading
in 1981. I have interacted the growth rate in the manufacturing variable, and the particulate reading
in 1981 with county non-attainment status and included the non-attainment dummy as a regressor.
A 1 % increase in manufacturing employment increases particulates by . 1 %. Note that the initial
particulate level coefficient is significant and negative. This indicates that counties with higher
particulate readings in 1981 enjoyed greater improvements in air quality than other counties.
Interestingly, this convergence does not differ between attainment and non-attainment counties. Table
Eight indicates that the non-attainment variables are jointly insignificant at the 10% significance
level.
It is important to note that equations (1-2) simply partition attainment and non-attainment
counties without trying to further disaggregate these coarse regulatory categories. A further
refinement would be to include a location's income. The impact of regulation may not be uniform
across states. Although the Clean Air Act's standards are uniform across states, unobserved
enforcement effort can vary.19 If air quality is a normal good, then richer states will demand higher
air quality levels. Following Grossman and Krueger's (1995) recent cross-national study, I
constructed a state level particulate panel data set to study the relationship between particulates and
real per-capita income. Given that all US states are beyond Grossman and Krueger's estimated per-
capita income "turning point", then we would expect to see that increased income lowers particulate
18Barro and Sali-Martin (1993) regress growth rates in state's per-capita income on initial state
income and show that in the United States there is evidence that the initially poorer states are slowly
converging to the level of the initially richer states.
19States have relaxed regulation's stringency when it has affected the survival of important local
job providers such as the steel industry (Deily and Gray 1991).
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levels. Evidence against this hypothesis is that particulates improved during the 1981 recession and
actually increased slightly as the economy grew in the 1980s. The estimates of the state level panel
are presented below;
log(TSP) = 4.18 -.14*(Notl981) + .005*Manuf - .003*Rain - .0013*Inc
(.23) (.02) (.002) (.0004) (.04)
N = 428 and R2 = .18
The standard errors are presented in the parentheses. I find that income has a statistically
insignificant impact on particulates.
To summarize this section's several findings, manufacturing does increase particulates but
there is little evidence pollution per unit of manufacturing decreased more quickly in more regulated
counties. The year dummies in the levels regressions indicate that controlling for climate, and
manufacturing levels, particulates fell sharply from 1981 to 1982 in both attainment and non-
attainment counties. Real income does not play a role in explaining improvements in the 1980s.
Reduced electric utility emissions may explain part of the overall decline in particulates
between 1981 and 1982. Freedman and Jaggi (1994) present a case study analysis of changes in air
pollution emissions for 105 electric utilities between 1975 and 1987. To reduce particulate, sulfur
dioxide, and nitrogen oxide emissions, utilities adopted electrostatic precipitators and burnt lower
sulfur coal. Although total coal consumption grew for most of these plants, particulate emissions fell
by over 90% at several of these plants. Using Freedman and Jaggi's data, I identified fourteen very
large electric utility plants that had greatly reduced their particulate emissions. For these plants, I
found evidence that the county they were located in was more likely to be in attainment of the 1987
PM-10 standard than the 1977 particulate standard. In 1977, 43% of the plants were located in
counties not in compliance. In 1987, all of these counties were in compliance with the PM-10
standard. This contrasts with 38% for 1977 and 7.4% in 1987 for counties that did not have one of
these plants.
V. Displacement of Economic Activity
Air quality can improve because pollution per unit falls or because the level of economic
activity decreases. Environmental regulation might reduce air pollution through both mechanisms.
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Directly, through lowering source pollution per unit of activity and indirectly by displacing activity
to less regulated areas. This spatial effect is analogous to the vintage effect discussed in Gruenspecht
(1981).
A growing literature has studied regulation's spatial and temporal substitution effects.20
Stringent Clean Air Act regulation may lead to cleaner non-attainment counties by deflecting activity
to non-monitored and attainment counties. The absence of air quality monitoring in certain counties
may encourage economic growth. The EPA assumes that counties it does not monitor are in
compliance with Clean Air Act Standards. It is reasonable to assume that less monitored counties are
less regulated. If this lowers the cost of producing a product, then a producer may choose to locate
there. To study this, I regress manufacturing growth between 1981 and 1988 on county attainment
status and on whether particulates are monitored in the county.
Table Nine reports these results. The left column presents county manufacturing growth
between 1981 and 1982. The county's growth rate in non-manufacturing employment is included as
a control. I find that the presence of a monitoring station does not affect county manufacturing
growth but that non-attainment counties experienced 3 % lower manufacturing growth. Between 1982
and 1987, I find that counties that monitor particulates and were not in attainment in 1977
experienced 11% lower manufacturing growth. Counties that were attainment and that were not
monitored grew 2% faster. The right column of Table Nine is identical to the middle column but
now I also estimate state fixed effects. Controlling for state effects, the displacement effect grows.
Counties which contain at least one monitoring station and are not in attainment suffered 14% lower
manufacturing growth between 1982 and 1988 than counties which did not monitor and were in
attainment.21
Table Nine's findings are based on aggregated data. A county experiencing manufacturing
20McConnell and Schwab (1991) found little evidence of spatial variation in environmental
regulation's intensity affecting manufacturing firms' location decisions. Maloney and Brady (1988)
and Nelson, Tietenberg and Donihue (1993) report evidence that more regulated electric utilities are
substituting toward older vintage capital that faces less regulatory constraints.
21One interesting hypothesis is that starting in 1987 as the particulate standard was phased out
and the PM-10 standard was brought in, that only counties that were not in attainment with the 1987
PM-10 standard should suffer manufacturing losses regardless of their initial particulate regulatory
status. Future research could use the 1987 and the 1992 Census of Manufacturing data to study this.
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job loss could be losing jobs at the extensive or the intensive margins. Existing plants may be closing
or surviving plants might be growing slower than they would have in a less regulated
environment.22
The Census of Manufacturer's LRD microdata offers an opportunity to explore each
individual manufacturing plant's probability of closing over a five year window and, conditional on
not closing, its percentage growth. I study closing probabilities and plant employment growth as a
function of plant size, industry, and whether the plant is located in an attainment county.23 Table
Ten's left two columns present the predictions from a logit model. For each two digit industry, I
estimate the probability that a plant open in 1977 was still open in 1982. The explanatory variables
are the plant's total employment in 1977, its employment squared, a dummy indicating whether the
plant was alive in 1967 and a dummy indicating whether the plant was located in an attainment
county. I use the coefficient estimates to predict each plant's probability of closing for a plant with
100 employees by 2 digit industry by county attainment status. Plants located in non-attainment
counties are less likely to close for 20 of the 23 industries. For example, for primary metals industry
(SIC 33), the same plant located in a non-attainment county had a 5.6% chance of closing between
1977 and 1987 while if it had been in an attainment county its probability would have been 6.8%.
These findings rule out that non-attainment counties are improving at a higher rate than attainment
counties because of the death of older plants or because highly polluting industries such as steel (SIC
33) are dying faster in the more regulated areas.
To study plant level employment growth for those plants that do not close, I estimate a simple
growth rate regression presented in equation (3).
2 (3)
j) = a + a2*Empi77 + a3*EmpgiTJ + a4*NonAttain. + U
This regression controls for plant size, plant vintage and its county's attainment status. The right
22Plants might be choosing not to locate in more regulated counties. A thorough analysis of this
discrete choice of where to locate a branch plant is beyond the scope of this paper. This paper
focuses on how county particulate attainment status affects growth of incumbent firms.
23Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1988, 1989) have also used the LRD to study the probability
of plants closing and growing. They did not include regulatory proxies in their analysis.
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column of Table Ten presents the coefficient on the dummy for non-attainment by two digit SIC. The
estimates are negative and statistically significant. For example, SIC 33 plants in non-attainment
areas grew by 10% less than the same plant if it had been located in an attainment area. My plant
level estimates suggest that plants in non-attainment areas are less likely to close but conditional on
staying open grow more slowly than their counterparts in attainment counties. One explanation for
this is that strict environmental regulation of new sources in these counties conveys some monopoly
power to the incumbents. The intensive margin findings do support Henderson's (1995) findings on
the displacement effects of ozone regulation.
In estimating equation (1), the relationship between particulates and manufacturing, I assumed
that the current level of manufacturing activity is not caused by current particulate levels.
This section's estimates indicate that manufacturing activity is slightly reduced by current regulation
levels. Thus, one might argue that there is a simultaneity problem when trying to estimate the impact
of manufacturing activity on air quality. In response to this claim it is important to note that the
estimated impact of environmental regulation on manufacturing activity is statistically significant but
in absolute terms not very large. Second, it is quite reasonable to assume that environmental
regulators react on a lag. A county's current particulate regulation in 1982 depends on its particulate
levels in previous years. Given this lagged structure, even if current manufacturing levels were a
function of current regulation, manufacturing levels would not depend on current particulate levels.
VI. Conclusion
Using a county level panel data set, this paper has documented the relationship between
manufacturing activity and particulates. Although increases in manufacturing do have a statistically
significant impact on particulates, there is little evidence that pollution per unit of manufacturing
activity declined during the 1980s. Surprisingly, I find no evidence that particulates per
manufacturing job fell faster for more regulated counties than for counties not assigned to the Clean
Air Act's non-attainment group.
This paper reported county and plant level evidence that particulate regulation has slightly
lowered economic activity. These findings add to Henderson's (1995) recent work on the
displacement effects of ozone regulation. Whether this economic displacement has high private costs
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depends on how substitutable are attainment and non-attainment areas for profit maximizing firms.24
The counter-factual that must be answered is; what is the producer surplus lost when plants are
discouraged from locating in non-attainment areas?
By combining this paper's estimates of the relationship between manufacturing activity and
particulates with existing hedonic and contingent valuation studies on the benefits of reduced air
pollution, future research can conduct improved green accounting exercises on the net social costs
of reduced manufacturing activity in the heavily populated Rust Belt. Such estimates of the social
benefits could be compared to the private costs suffered by displaced manufacturing workers.
24Little research has tried to estimate the additional cost a firm incurs by operating in a non-
attainment area. Researchers have stressed energy and labor costs as more important considerations
than environmental regulation in affecting plant locational choice. Surprisingly, Crichfield (1990)
reports that industry are not more likely to vacate unionized sectors.
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The unit of analysis is a county in a given year.
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Table Two


















































































































































































Panel data by monitoring station on transition over time. Quantile #1 are the cleanest counties, quantile #10 are the dirties. For 1981 and 1987, 1888 data points, in
1981 assign each monitoring station to one of ten deciles, the repeat in 1987 and study the transition matrix. For example, the reading in the matrix for 1981 decile #6
and 1987 decile #4 is .13. This indicates that 13% of the sample in the 6th decile in 1981 improved in air quality up to the #4 decile by 1987.
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Table Four






















































































































































































































units are micrograms per cubic meter
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Table Five













































































































































































Manuf * 1982 dummy
Manuf * 1983 dummy
Manuf * 1984 dummy
Manuf * 1985 dummy
Manuf * 1986 dummy
Manuf* 1987 dummy
Manuf * 1988 dummy

































































































— indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, * significance at the 5% level, and ** significance at the 1% level.
Fixed effect F-test for attainment counties F(892,4931) = 24.2, p-value = .00, Fixed effect F-test for non-attainment counties F(309,2170) = 23.7, p-value = .00.
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Table Seven
"Rust Belt" County Paniculate Regressions











Manuf * 1982 dummy
Manuf * 1983 dummy
Manuf * 1984 dummy
Manuf * 1985 dummy
Manuf * 1986 dummy
Manuf * 1987 dummy

















































~ indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, * significance at the 5% level, and ** significance at the 1% level.
Fixed effect F-test for attainment counties F(169,828) = 30.1, p-value = .00, Fixed effect F-test for non-attainment counties F(136,935) = 18.0, p-value = .00.
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Table Eight




log of paniculate level in 1981
county non-attainment dummy
county non-attainment dummy
interacted with growth in
manufacturing
county non-attainment dummy






















Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the growth rate from 1981 to 1987 in county weighted mean particulates. An F-test testing
whether the non-attainment regressors are jointly insignificant cannot be rejected at the 10% level. F(3,818) = 1.86,prob > F = .134
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Table Nine
Growth in Manufacturing Employment
The dependent variable is the growth rate in county manufacturing employment.
constant
non-attainment dummy







































standard errors in parentheses
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Table Ten





23 (Apparel and Other Textiles)
24 (Lumber and Wood)
25 (Furniture and Fixtures)
26 (Paper)
27 (Printing and Publishing)
28 (Chemicals)
30 (Rubber and Plastics)
31 (Leather)






























Prob Plant Close 1977-
1987





























































The plant level closing probabilities are generated by estimating a separate logit model for each two digit SIC. For attainment and non-attainment counties, I predict probabilities for a
firm with 100 employees for plants built after 1970. For plants that do not close between 1982 and 1987,1 estimate plant growth rates as given in equation (3). * indicates statistical
significance at the 5% level and ** indicates statistical significance at the 1 % level. Gap is defined as the left column minus the second to left column.
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